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No medical practice area is being as affected by the 
massive introduction of telediagnosis as cardiology.1  In 
2011, in the state of Santa Catarina (SC), Brazil, the Santa 
Catarina State Integrated Telemedicine and Telehealth 
System (STT/SC),2 an initiative responsible to the state 
government for performing telediagnosis activities for the 
Brazilian Unified Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde 
- SUS) in SC, was responsible for carrying out 105,025 tele-
electrocardiography examinations, which, according to the 
Outpatient Information System (Sistema de Informações 
Ambulatoriais -SIA/SUS), represented 29% of the total of 
electrocardiographic examinations performed by the SUS 
in SC during this period. In many cities in the countryside 
of SC, the practice of cardiology telediagnosis enabled an 
increase in the offer of electrocardiography examinations 
by over 300%, which certainly will change the morbidity 
profile of this population over the next five or ten years.3 The 
practice of telecardiology has come to stay; satisfaction 
studies performed in Santa Catarina have demonstrated 
that the acceptance and use of this method suggest that its 
use will only increase.4
However, there are still open questions regarding elec-
tro nic remote issuance of reports, especially with respect 
to the promises of benefits of digital certification in elec-
tro nic documents, which must be printed with rigorous 
authentication and integrity, providing them a legal effect.5 
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Is the current solution satisfactory?
The answer is yes and no. Smart cards, as long as they are used 
in safe environments, such as hospitals intranets, isolated from 
Internet access, are extremely safe solutions. They may be used 
with no restrictions, for example, to certify medical prescriptions 
or reports in controlled environments. However, on a computer 
with Internet access, as in a physician’s office or in a telemedicine 
system, where the physician may access and sign a document 
from anywhere, including from a cybercafé in case he/she needs 
to issue an emergency medical report, the smart card poses a 
risk. The physician cannot trust the other software that runs in 
such computers. Thus, a malicious software could even request 
for a signature of the physician’s card without being noticed.10
Why does this happen? While the smart card is inserted 
into the reader connected to a computer, its signature module 
may be used by any software in that computer. This makes the 
smart card vulnerable to malicious programs, such as malware, 
that save the password entered by the user (PIN), capture the 
communication between the keyboard and the computer (key 
loggers) and are, then, free to use the smart card. Within seconds 
people without physical access to the smart card can sign 
documents on the Internet. It is important to observe that, for 
the patient, the risk is very small, except in specific cases. But the 
physician that owns such certificate is the one who may suffer 
the consequences, according to Brazilian laws and regulations.8
Among the problems regarding the massive use of digital 
signatures in medical environments, interoperability is 
poorly addressed. The use of smart cards and cryptographic 
tokens may interpose itself between the medical task and the 
creation of the electronic document with the digital signature. 
Problems may arise, for example, upon certifying the electronic 
report due to problems associated with the installation of the 
devices. In this case, the physician must be able to conclude 
the report in another computer provided with interoperability. 
Undoubtedly, this causes troubles for the physician’s activity 
and takes time that could be used for better purposes.4
There are ways to avoid these problems. Having identified 
this situation, the Computer Safety Laboratory (Laboratório de 
Segurança em Computação – LabSEC of UFSC), in a partnership 
with the Brazilian National Institute for Digital Convergence 
(Instituto Nacional para Convergência Digital – INCoD), the 
Bry company from SC, and the Santa Catarina State Health 
Department are performing, for the STT/SC, a research to 
develop a new form of two-factor authentication digital 
signature through the FINEP CIM – Saúde project.12,13
This project is creating a technology that will allow for safe 
electronic signature of medical documents anywhere and from 
any computer. This solution will use storage and use of private 
keys in signature servers, called hardware security modules 
(HSMs). HSMs are devices intended to keep cryptographic keys 
safe that, in addition to resisting to attacks in a more robust 
way than smart cards, have an integrated audit process to 
ensure the correct use of the keys. The A3 certificates, to be 
used by physicians when signing electronic documents, will be 
used together with unique confirmation passwords generated 
by the physician’s cell phone through an authentication 
system linked to the HSM.14
Digital certification is the only technology capable of safely 
replacing paper documents signed by physicians for equivalent 
electronic documents. Electronic documents are easier to 
circulate, copy, and store; additionally, they can provide more 
detailed information, such as high quality images and data in 
formats that preserve its dynamic characteristics, as a film 
or angiography.6 However, replacing the physical documents 
for electronic documents is not easy.7 There are technological, 
legal, political, interface, and acceptance challenges to be 
faced.5
In order to sign an electronic document, the physician 
needs a computer and a digital identity issued by one of the 
certification authorities accredited by the Brazilian Public Key 
Infrastructure (Infraestrutura de Chaves Públicas Brasileira 
[ICP-Brasil]), established by Provisional Measure (MP) 2.200, 
of August 2, 2001.8  The digital identity is known in the 
information technology world as a digital certificate. Linked 
to the digital certificate is an exclusive cryptographic key pair 
known as the public key and private key. The private key (or 
signature key) is used to sign electronic documents, and the 
public key is used to verify the signature.9
Nonetheless, in terms of technology, there are practical 
issues to be addressed so that physicians have access to 
digital certification and can trustingly sign their electronic 
documents. One of these issues regards what is established by 
the sole paragraph of article six of MP 2.200-2, which imposes 
on the holder of the digital certificate the sole responsibility 
for generating the pair of cryptographic keys, with total control 
over the use of the signature key throughout the entire digital 
certificate life cycle. It is not simple to apply this standard, 
since the current technology based on smart cards does not 
provide such guarantees.10
ICP-Brasil established, among others, two main types 
of digital certificates, A1 and A3. The A1 digital certificate, 
effective for a maximum period of one year, can have its 
private key stored in the computer memory. A3 is effective 
for up to five years and its private key should be generated and 
maintained in a cryptographic hardware.11 The most famous 
are the smart card and the USB cryptographic token. A smart 
card is a hardware device to store cryptographic keys in a card. 
A token is a smart card with USB interface. 
The control of the private key is much safer using these 
cryptographic devices than using the computer memory 
for storage. However, the connection of new peripherals 
to computers creates a major interoperability problem. If 
the smart card or the cryptographic token is not properly 
installed in the computer, users may have problems executing 
signatures with the key in cryptographic hardware,9 as the key 
is restricted to the device – if the device is not accessible, the 
digital signature cannot be performed.
Indeed, the A1 certificate was created for situations 
where the use of A3 certificates is not possible, such as Web 
servers and network equipment. The use of A1 certificates is 
a problem, as it is impossible to impose on the physician the 
responsibility for using his/her signature key. Conversely, 
the use of A3 certificates imposes the use of smart cards, 
which is precisely the solution currently sought by the 
Federal Medical Council in its digital certification project 
for physicians.11
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With this solution, the physician does not need to carry his/
her smart card, leaving it connected to a HSM installed in a safe 
room, an environment built to provide extremely robust physical 
access control, where high security systems are usually located. 
The risk of having a password stolen is eliminated by the counter 
password, which is created and sent to the cell phone and may be 
used only one time, for example, to validate a batch of documents 
that a cardiologist issued in a STT/SC session terminated with 
this counter password. To confirm the electronic signature in a 
new batch of reports, the physician will have to generate a new 
counter password in his cell phone that will be valid only for a 
few minutes, in order to further reduce the risk of invasion.14
Therefore, the use of signatures by physicians becomes very 
simple. All they have to do is request from the system a new 
signature. The system produces a multidimensional barcode 
(QRCode) including all information of the document to be 
signed. Then, the physician uses the camera of his/her cell 
phone to import all this data. The cell phone screen displays 
a subscription term for the documents, which explains what 
this signature is. He/she confirms and enters his PIN in the 
cell phone. Then, a 6-digit code is generated to validate that 
signature for the tele-report service and requests the signing 
of the document to the HSM.14
This code generated stores all data of the signing operation; 
thus, if any malicious agent tries to change any information about 
the authorization and signature, the HSM, which will effectively 
sign, denies the request. It is important to highlight that the 
physician must always validate the information signed in his/
her mobile device and, if something is subsequently changed, 
this will not affect the report stored in the STT/SC server.14
In addition to the safety advantages mentioned, the use 
of such a system enables the physician to effectively issue a 
report from any computer and at any place, without necessarily 
having to trust in the computer used. This happens because 
the whole process of signature confirmation takes place in his/
her mobile device and the only thing entered into the unsafe 
computer is the authorization code linked to that signature. 
Besides not wasting time with the installation of a token or 
card in the computer, the physician can be fully sure that the 
signing process always takes place in the device over which 
he/she has total control (his/her cell phone).14
Another important point about this solution is the case 
of malicious software installed in the machine where the 
physician issues the report. Unlike smart cards and tokens, 
the mobile device solution does not allow for the insertion of 
a signature without being noticed by the physician. Another 
major advantage of the proposed system is the maintenance of 
a history of signatures executed by a physician in his/her cell 
phone. With this history, in case of reports not signed by the 
physician, he/she can prove through his/her signature history 
that the signature is fake.14
Does this strategy solve the problems?
It appears so, but the world is always evolving, and a safe 
solution today may not be safe in the future. As it happens with 
every security strategy, there will always be people engaged in 
finding ways of breaking it and, eventually, they will find a way. 
Here judgement must be used, and the question asked: how hard 
it is to forge a signature in a piece of paper? Does anyone give a 
second look to a paper illegibly signed, with a stamp from the 
Regional Medical Council? In everyday life, the digital signature 
certainly represents a much safer and more practical solution 
than paper documents, providing the physician with security 
and agility. It is important to be constantly questioning and 
refining technology, to ensure that everyone’s legal certainty, 
including the physician’s. 
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